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TO : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

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INFO: REDSOX - Frankfurt

FROM : Chief, SR

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/REDSOX

SPECIFIC - Review of Baltic Operations #3

REF: July : A. MGCW-14433 B. MGMA-10305

ATTN : REDSOX - Munich

Transmitted herewith is a Headquarters Review of Baltic Operations.

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SUBJECT: Review of Baltic Operations #3

1. General:

Since the reporting of developments in reference "A" the accomplishments of our Baltic operational effort may be set in the following order of priority:

- a. Dispatch of the ABCOB team.
- b. Dispatch of two agent teams through Scandinavia and Finland.
- c. Establishment of cordial operational cooperation with Norway, Finland, and Sweden. Our relationship with the above named intelligence services has substantially improved and now widens considerably our theatre of operations.
- d. Development of U.S. training facilities.
- e. Agreement with the British for a joint CAPSTAN operation in Spring 1953.

2. Operational Planning

With the transfer of Baltic training to the United States it is appropriate to examine the shift of responsibilities from the field to Headquarters and the consequent reassignment of duties and personnel.

- a. In our view the responsibilities of the CSOB Baltic Branch will henceforth be as follows:
 - (1) The accumulation and prompt dispatch to Headquarters of all operational data gathered through refugees, repatriate, and other sources.
 - (2) On-the-spot support and guidance of emigre psychological warfare and political action potential.
 - (3) Selective agent recruitment. In order to correct any possible misunderstanding on this subject in view of the agent recruitment responsibilities undertaken by Headquarters, we would like to state clearly that a continual search for suitable individuals to become American agents is one of the primary responsibilities and tasks of every intelligence officer. In view of the emigration of most of the suitable Baltic agent prospects from Germany to other parts of the world, Headquarters has assumed the major responsibility for Baltic agent recruitment in the Western Hemisphere, however, the search for suitable agent material in Germany and Austria remains to be a CSOB responsibility. Paragraph 3c(1) of reference "A" was apparently unclearly stated. Its purpose was to discourage any plans for the establishment of agent recruiting chains leading from our CSOB indigenous consultants to individuals in Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Britain. On the other hand in order not to miss any agent prospects in those areas we hoped that if any outstanding agent candidates were

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known to our indigenous consultants in those areas such names would be forwarded to Headquarters, and be followed up through the appropriate area desks and stations. Our reference to recruitment on an individual basis as opposed to recruitment through a group, obviously referred to "singletons" or individuals recruited through a principal agent rather than through the device of asking a representative of an emigre group to produce a number of agent prospects. An example of such recruitment is the two AECOB individuals now under consideration, the four agents being utilized on Scandinavian missions, as well as the few other "singletons" utilized by us. In spite of the difficulties recruitment of such personnel presents we still must continue our search for agent prospects who will be solely under American control, direction, and who would be satisfied to be just good professional intelligence agents.

- (4) On-the-spot follow up of operational leads.
- (5) Air and overland dispatch facilities based in Germany. This task will be an overall CSOB responsibility and Baltic area and language specialists will be called on as the need arises.

b. Headquarters newly-acquired Baltic responsibilities will be as follows:

- (1) Agent recruitment in the Western Hemisphere as well as in other parts of the world through the relevant area stations, except in Germany and Austria where the responsibility remains with CSOB.
- (2) The training, documenting, and completely preparing for dispatch of all Baltic agents. It may be stated here that for Headquarters to perform this responsibility all of the CSOB field personnel previously assigned to Baltic training units will be expected to return to the U.S. and be assigned to DOB. At the present time, with the conclusion of CAPSTAN and AECOB training in Germany, only one case officer - MARK GAMERTON - has reported to Headquarters for this duty. Personnel matters are discussed more fully in the subsequent paragraphs.
- (3) Supervision of indigenous consultants formerly stationed in Germany.
- (4) Headquarters will supply agent escorting officers who will accompany the agent to Germany (or elsewhere) for dispatch purposes and will remain with the agent to the moment of actual dispatch.

c. Headquarters capability of performing the above tasks, which were formerly the responsibility of the field, will largely depend upon the return to Headquarters duty of experienced case officer personnel. You are undoubtedly aware that the current Headquarters desk personnel are not geared to undertake the above-described additional functions. The activities of the Baltic Branch have been more fully described in reference "A" para 2. Desk personnel assigned to the supervision of our Scandinavian operations cannot be relieved of such responsibility and assigned to DOB Baltic training units, nor can the chiefs of

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area sections forego their Headquarters responsibilities and become agent case officers. In the AEONIAN and AECOB cases we have endeavored to improvise wherein the area desk officers doubled in brass as agent case officers. This was found to be highly unsatisfactory and inefficient. It is our considered opinion that in order to maintain adequate professional and security standards each training unit must have a team of 3 case officers assigned to it, - this is of course besides any indigenous consultants who cannot be used in place of staff personnel in any training to be done in the United States.

- d. Pending the assignment of qualified personnel, we are planning the activation of the following Baltic training units:

(1) AECOB: 2 agents
DOB case officer: []
Jr. case officer: []
Safehousekeeper: To be provided by DOB
Native Instructors: CAMBARD 1 and 2
Headquarters Desk Officer: []

(2) AEONIAN: 2 agents
DOB case officer: []
Jr. case officer: Currently in training
Safehousekeeper: Available
Native Instructors: AEONIAN 1 and 4
Headquarters Desk Officer: []

(3) AEBASIN: 3 agents from Sweden
DOB case officer: []
Jr. case officer: []
Safehousekeeper: To be provided by DOB
Native Instructors: []
Headquarters Desk Officer: []

- e. You will note from the above that in order to activate the above units we are in immediate need of one senior case officer and two junior case officers. Your comments and recommendations by cable of the personnel qualified to fill these slots will be appreciated.
- f. The trial joint CANTRIP operation will not materially affect our staff AEONIAN personnel. Stateside recruitment, assessment, and initial training of CAPSTAN or CANTRIP candidates will continue on indefinite basis.
- g. DOB does not assume any but technical training responsibilities for agents. Area branches and their case officers assigned to DOB are responsible for the overall operation, area briefing, cover, documentation, security, morale, etc.

3. Operations

- a. During the past several months a great deal of effort has been devoted to developing cordial operational cooperation with Scandinavian and Finnish Intelligence Services. This effort we believe has had most

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gratifying results and DYGLAIM assets in this vitally important area have been materially increased. Given qualified agent personnel infiltration and exfiltration through this area no longer constitutes a dream but an operational reality. Possible termination of para-military dispatch operations will not now leave us in as dire an operational predicament as would have been the case but a few months ago. In developing Scandinavian operations independent of CSOB activities as well as a hedge against CSOB para-military dispatch facilities, Headquarters plans to continue its efforts in building up DYGLAIM assets in this area of operations.

- b. AEBASIN. Field action on assessment, selection, and recruitment of BASIN agent candidates is awaited. Formation of a BASIN training unit is planned by 1 January 1953. Pending on the success of the CAMUSOS, the AEBASIN team will probably be dispatched to them from Germany for further movement to the target area in the fall of 1953. Alternate possibilities of overland infiltration from Karelo-Finland are also being given all consideration.
 - c. AEGOB. We propose to have at least one two-man agent team ready for infiltration from Germany in Spring 1953. The operation will be planned to proceed irrespective of the fate of the CAMUSOS or possible joint dispatch with BROADWAY.
 - d. AEBONIAN/CAPSTAN. A two-man agent team to be in London by 1 November 1952 for the CANTERIP operation. Additional recruitment will continue on indefinite basis.
 - e. CASHIER 4. We propose to continue the general strategy outlined in MUNI 8499 in our contact with subject. This is to be followed at the opportune time with developing an exfiltration angle to be implemented in Spring 1953. We propose to press subject more and more to reveal his contacts and the limits of capabilities. When the opportunity arises we will check those parts of his claims which may be checkable inside the target area without unduly risking the new assets we hope to establish.
- IM CNA EC**
- f. In psychological warfare and political action fields, consideration is now being given to the proposals brought back by [redacted]. The establishment of a Baltic roof organization appears to be a step in the right direction. A separate memo will be prepared by [redacted] dealing exclusively with these matters.

- 4. It is anticipated that many of the matters discussed herein will be included in the agenda of the forthcoming Headquarters conference with [redacted] and [redacted] shall be pleased to amplify at that time any questions you may have or give all consideration to your suggestions.

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